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Abstract 
Fast growing economies with limited formal banking services experience greater financial exclusion and 
transaction curtailment, but mobile technology offers fast cheap money transfers and facilitates transactions. 
African appetite for mobile banking developed along the explosion in mobile phone technology. Mobile phone 
companies stood up to the challenge, but had to address peculiar geographies of remoteness and inaccessibility. 
Strategies of financial inclusion were developed by the sophisticated financial system in South Africa, which 
affected the unbanked’s demand for mobile money services.  M-Pesa is the most successful and fastest growing 
mobile money service product. It has already delivered numerous innovations in mobile money products and 
services. Regulatory rigidity affected the take-up of mobile money services in some African markets, but overall 
mobile communication networks introduced innovative products to extend mobile banking into remote rural 
locations. The rapidly expanding mobile money service market stimulates entrepreneurial activity, creates 
employment and serves as a major contributor to state revenue where liberal market economic policies permit.   
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Africa’s economy 
African economies experienced high growth towards the end of the colonial period, but this 
trend was reversed by socialist policies after independence, eventually exacerbated by the 
slump and recession in the world economy following the oil crises of the 1970s. African 
economies then fell into unprecedented levels of debt (which was the heaviest relative to per 
capita income (Madison, 2007:235) in the world). World Bank structural adjustment 
programmes in the later 1980s were aimed at liberalising markets, reducing the role of the state 
and freeing trade (Van der Geest, 1994). These programmes were met with highly ideological 
opposition (Husain, 1994:153-155, 157), but global market liberalisation soon found its way 
into the policy debates of African countries. African economies subsequently gradually 
returned to growth for the first time since the late 1960s by the 1990s. GDP growth in Africa 
declined from 4.7 percent between 1965-1973, to 1.2 percent between 1981 and 1985, and to 
1.7 percent in 1991. As the twenty-first century dawned upon Africa, sustained strong growth 
returned in market oriented economic contexts.  Global market liberalisation and the 
democratisation of governments following the demise of the USSR, brought about a 
fundamental change in Africa (Babarinde, 2009). Overall deregulation of financial services and 
improved factor mobility enhanced business prospects for new African enterprises. During 
2013/14 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)  (excluding South Africa) maintained GDP growth of 6 
percent, which was well ahead of the average for the global GDP growth of around 2,4 percent 
(World Bank, 2014). Rapid economic growth depends on optimal factor mobility, including 
the movement of money. Africa has therefore experienced unprecedented growth in 
infrastructure and telecommunication investment and information technology connectivity. 
Mobile technology developments dovetailed these trends in Africa. The mobile industry is a 
key driver of economic growth and employment across Africa. In 2014 the broader mobile 
ecosystem contributed 5.7 percent to SSA’s GDP. This was a contribution of $102 billion in 
economic value and supported 4.4 million employment opportunities in the region. The mobile 
ecosystem contributed approximately $15 billion to public finance through taxes paid (GMSA 
Report, 2015).  
 
 
Mobile banking framework 
Mobile banking is the most innovative development in financial systems and provides a 
platform for payment services without the need for a formal bank account. Mobile banking has 
the additional advantage of improving financial inclusion, providing cost savings for money 
transfers and its potential for socio-economic development across the world. Mobile payments 
or m-payments are defined as ‘the use of a Near Field Communication (NFC) enabled mobile 
device or a contactless card on a SIM to conduct payment in a proximity setting by connecting 
to a server, perform authentication and authorization, make a payment, initiate accounting and 
finally confirm the completed transaction’ (de Reuver et al., 2014, p.332). Mobile network 
operators provide the network infrastructure required for mobile payments (m-payments), thus 
providing convenience to customers and ease of use   . They are best placed to provide the data, 
bill clients for purchases made, and settle payments with merchants.  It was a logical step for 
network operators to provide financial services to customers that were previously the exclusive 
domain of financial institutions. Financial institutions to enter into partnerships with the mobile 
networks to provide the financial services.   
In the developed world banks and other financial institutions are increasingly making the shift 
from ‘human’ to ‘digital’ banking, placing growing emphasis on flexibility of use and ease of 
access to banking services, payment mechanisms and integrated money management and 
monitoring platforms. It has been established that digital usage has become closely linked to 
customer’s loyalty (Arnfield, 2015; Baxter and Vater, 2014), despite forfeiting anonymity of 
paper currency with non-anonymous electronic money (Rogoff, 2014). In the absence of well-
established bank networks in developing countries people tend to display a preference for cash 
and a distrust or scepticism in mobile money transfer mechanisms (Dzokoto, 2013). In 
developing countries the security concern to ordinary people carrying cash, has become an 
additional motivation to address financial exclusion of the vast unbanked sector. Globally it is 
estimated that 2.5 billion people, of whom more than half are adults, have no bank accounts. 
In Africa only one in four persons has a bank account, but eight in ten have access to a mobile 
phone. By mid-2015 200 million persons across Africa were accessing the internet through 
mobile devices (GMSA, 2015). Apart from the notable cost saving of electronic payments 
(Babatz, 2013), far-reaching innovation enabled by mobile technologies can enhance the 
current growth trajectory of Africa.  
Mobile banking in Africa 
Successful mobile banking penetration in developing economies has taken place mainly in 
Africa and South Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa had more unique subscribers than Latin America 
by late 2014, which placed the region in third position behind Asia Pacific and Europe. During 
the first decade of the twenty-first century SSAs subscriber base increased by 13 percent which 
was faster that the global average growth of 6 percent. The most success has been achieved in 
SSA with 81 percent mobile money according to the GMSA global survey (GMSA, 2014): 
 By the end of 2015 SSA unique subscribers had risen from 200 million in 2010 to 386 million 
(with a penetration rate of 41 percent) and 722 million connections (or a 77 percent penetration 
rate). Mobile broadband connections were at 24 percent, while data growth was driving 
revenues and operator investments. The mobile penetration rate of the two most populous 
countries in SSAA, namely Ethiopia and Nigeria, is at 23 percent and 31 percent respectively 
(GSMA, 2014). The impressive growth in the mobile market boosted revenues handsomely, 
but the rate of revenue increase has slowed down as more markets were integrated into mobile 
operations. The Global Financial Crisis had a profound adverse effect on mobile operators’ 
revenue growth. Revenue growth was restored to around 5 percent in 2010 and rose to around 
7 percent in 2013, but slumped to 3.5 percent in 2015. This slowdown was not only a result of 
slower growth in subscriber numbers, but also cuts in mobile termination rates, intense price 
competition, new low-income customers spending proportionally less on communication 
services and the depreciation of most SSA currencies.  
In the four regional blocks in Africa, the Southern African Development Community, with 15 
member states, has the most developed mobile market. There are significant variation in 
penetration levels within the block, with 19 percent in Madagascar to 70 percent in Botswana 
and Mauritius. South Africa is the largest mobile market and accounts for around 33 percent 
of total subscriptions in the entire region. By 2015 South Africa had 38 million unique 
subscribers in the block of 132 million unique subscribers. Technology transfers (uptake of 4G 
technology) is advanced with mobile broadband accounting for 25 percent of total connectivity. 
SADC is also the second largest smartphone market in SSA. The leading country in mobile 
tech innovations over the last five years, is Kenya, referred to as “Silicon Savannah”, the 
epicentre of this development (GMSA, 2014). The regional block known as the East African 
Community, has mobile penetration of less than 25 percent (less than four in ten persons) by 
63 million unique subscribers. Kenya has the highest mobile penetration rate of 42 percent and 
Burundi 17 percent. Access and affordability barriers to the two-thirds rural majority in the 
block explain the low penetration levels. The expansion of mobile broadband networks assisted 
the rollout of 3G and 4G technology, which of course is also enhanced by the growing adoption 
of cheaper smartphone devices. Ecowas is the West African regional block, with 163 million 
unique subscribers, that make up around 40 percent of SSA subscribers. The region has a 
mobile penetration rate exceeding the SSA average, but the penetration rate varies significantly 
amongst members: Nigeria has 83 million subscribers and a penetration rate of 17 percent, 
while Mali has a 68 percent penetration rate. Technology innovation is slow in this region, with 
2G accounting for 90 percent of mobile connections. For data-only operations 4G networks are 
being introduced in Cȏte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria, but those services are primarily limited 
to a few major centres. Smartphone usage accounts for only 20 percent of total connections. In 
the 10 member Economic Community of Central African States mobile penetration reached 38 
percent by 2014, with 43 million unique subscribers in 2015. The level of technological 
innovation is low, with 90 percent usage of 2G technology, although broadband introduction 
in Angola and Gabon facilitates the introduction of 4G. Smartphone usage is only at 15 percent 
(GMSA, 2014).     
The mobile markets in SSA are highly competitive, except for Ethiopia. In most SSA markets 
lively competition exist between service providers, except in Ethiopia. Ethiopia only has one 
active mobile network operator, Ethio-Telecom (also the only fixed line provider), which is a 
legacy of the former nationalisation of the economy. In some markets four or five operators 
compete, resulting in a very low Herfindahl-Hisrchman Index (HHI) of 4,834. This means that 
intense competition keeps costs low – a phenomenon that impacted negatively on operator 
margins resulting in discouraging new entrants to the market and gradual consolidation. In 
Tanzania Airtel acquired Zantel; in Kenya Safaricom and Airtel jointly acquired Yu’s assets in 
the Republic of Congo and Uganda Airtel also acquired the competitor Warid Telecom. 
Consolidation and expanding networks incentivised technological innovation, with expanding 
3G uptake and the gradual 4G delivery in the technology-leading markets of Angola, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe. The new technology is gradually supported by the growing use of 
smartphones, as these devices become cheaper. In 2015, 160 million smartphones were in use 
in Africa (GSMA, 2015).   
Kenya is especially known for the mobile banking innovation leadership in Africa. This 
country has adopted wide spread and diversified use of mobile payments. It is estimated that 
60 percent of the GDP of Kenya moves through mobile money (Pénicaud, 2013). This is mainly 
as a result of the launch in March 2007 by Vodafone for Kenya’s largest mobile network 
provider Safaricom of the mobile money product M-Pesa (‘M’ denoting mobile and Pesa is the 
Swahili word for money). M-Pesa facilitates person-to-person transfers through the use of 
mobile phones. It was observed that people were selling airtime into a network akin to a 
banking grid, which enabled the recipient to re-sell the airtime and basically getting ‘cash’ for 
the sold airtime. In remote areas and in the absence of extensive branch networks, mobile 
phones were used to facilitate cheap and instant payments to the broad population. M-Pesa uses 
a mobile phone to transfer money, deliver finance and also later developed microfinancing 
facilities. M-Pesa enables users to deposit money into an account stored on the mobile phone. 
The account holder can then use a Short Message Service (SMS) using a secured PIN to send 
money to other users or withdraw deposited money at different retail outlets or pay for goods 
and services.  
This product has been so successful that four years after its launch, it is estimated that 
approximately 70 percent of all households in Kenya are using M-Pesa. As the population is 
spread throughout large parts of Kenya, the M-Pesa system allows users via a SMS to transfer 
money to another without having physically to transfer the cash (saving on time, transport and 
lowering risk of theft). As this system makes use of SMS technology, it provides a wide range 
of users the ability to use this technology as only a basic hand-held device is needed.  The use 
of m-technology greatly reduces the cost of sending money over large distances and provides 
certainty of process and risk of theft of the money. The M-Pesa system also consists of agents 
dispersed around the country that convert e-money into currency and vice versa (Jack & Suri, 
2014).  Only during the last 11 months of 2014 transactions to the value of more than K 
Shillings 2.1 trillion were conducted through M-Pesa in Kenya – that is almost half the value 
of the country’s GDP. 
Soon afterwards product innovation led to the introduction of a related product, M-Shwari, a 
savings and loan facility. M-Shwari signed up 9 million customers and attracted deposits to the 
value of Kenyan Shillings 135 billion ($1,6 billion) within the first two years of its operation. 
The loans issued through M-Shwari are cheaper to administer and easier to scale than the 
micro-lending schemes in operation. The M-Pesa facility was later also linked to formal bank 
accounts through a partnership with the Equity Bank, based in Kenya. The product is M-Kesho, 
which is a facility using the M-Pesa platform and agent network to offer more banking services 
to customers, such as interest-bearing accounts, loans and insurance. 
M-Pesa was soon introduced in neighbouring African countries. In 2008 M-Pesa was launched 
in Tanzania, but did not attract the same subscriber volumes as in Kenya. Vodafone introduced 
strategic changes to its service delivery to improve its market position in Tanzania, which 
resulted in the rapid expansion of the use of mobile technology. By March 2013 M-Pesa users 
rose to 5 million in Tanzania and by the end of 2015, Tanzania was the country in Africa with 
the highest proportion of registered mobile money account users per 1 000 adults – 1208 per 
1000, compared to1018 in Kenya, 762 in Uganda and only 76 in South Africa (GMSA, 2014). 
Since the launch of M-Pesa other competitors such as Mobikash, Orange Money and Airtel 
Money now offer similar services to M-Pesa.  M-Pesa has since spread to ten countries: 
Tanzania, South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, India, Mozambique, Egypt, Lesotho, 
Albania and Romania.  Vodafone has recently announced that it will provide M-Pesa in Ghana 
after launching a pilot project in August 2015 (Steafel, 2015).  










M-Pesa in South Africa 
 
Vodacom South Africa launched M-PESA in September 2010 in partnership with Nedbank, 
and it was hoped to have similar successes as the project had in Kenya. South Africa, unlike 
the markets in East Africa, has a highly developed financial system and local banks have 
already made banking easily accessible to the low-income earners by increasing the number of 
branches in rural areas and providing bank accounts aimed specifically at unbanked population. 
Nedbank was relying on the extensive mobile phone penetration in South Africa as well as the 
13 million economically active South Africans without bank accounts, to grasp the opportunity 
M-Pesa offered for swift and cheap money transfers and retail purchases. South Africa already 
had other mobile banking applications and a number of these banking applications were 
provided by local banks. M-Pesa was not the resounding success in South Africa that it was in 
Kenya – it was taken up by just 100 000 users by May 2011. However unlike in Kenya, there 
were only a few agents distributed around the country and its financial partner, Nedbank, has 
historically been the retail bank focusing on urban areas (Verhoef, 1987) and did therefore not 
have the branch network to support the penetration of M-Pesa in remote rural areas.  
The main reasons for the lack-luster appetite in the South African market for the M-Pesa 
opportunity were varied. In the first instance cheap accessible channels existed to transfer 
money. The largest retailer in South Africa, Shoprite, has a facility in place whereby customers 
can deposit money for a small fee of R9.99 at any Shoprite outlet (of which there are more than 
900 outlets in South Africa and 294 corporate and 39 franchise stores outside South Africa in 
14 African countries) to any branch in the country, where the recipient can make withdrawals 
upon payment of purchases, or simply use it to purchase consumer goods from the outlet. 
Furthermore a preference for cash remained high amongst those persons wanting to transfer 
money. A survey in 2014 under persons sending or receiving remittance transfers to or from 
family and friends within South Africa, 32 percent sent cash with a relative or friend (Robb, 
2014). The regulatory rigidity in South Africa also contributed to the sluggish uptake of M-
Pesa. The South African Reserve Bank does not implement a special dispensation for non-bank 
or e-money providers. This is the reason why mobile money providers in South Africa partner 
with banks, which is the strategic opposite of the experience in the other African markets. These 
mobile money providers are treated as banks and must comply fully with all the requirements 
associated with banks – such as customer identification by means of face-to-face identity 
verification and proof of residence. In Tanzania regulatory accommodation in a different 
manner as for formal banks, was the key to the success after the initial service delivery 
adjustments were made by Vodacom. In all of the other African jurisdictions the regulatory 
accommodation of mobile money providers outside the formal banking system has encouraged 
competition, pushed costs down and stimulated the growth in mobile money usage. In his 
explanation for the disappointing performance of M-Pesa, the CEO of Vodacom South Africa 
stated in  May 2011,  ‘…The banking sector here is much more developed’, thus alluding to 
the nature and regulatory context of banking in South Africa as the most convincing reason for 
the development. The reliance on Nedbank was also an error of judgement, since Nedbank had 
little penetration amongst the lower-income groups in rural areas and no attempt was made to 
put in place the type of widespread and informal infrastructure it had in Kenya (Goldstruck, 
2014). 
The implementation of M-Pesa was suspended but re-launched in June 2011. A much expanded 
distribution network of agents in remote areas where people live and work, was introduced. 
The South African Reserve Bank did not relax the regulatory requirements. This time people 
of a higher Living Standards Measure (LSM) were targeted, but only 1.6 million users have 
been reported despite the low transaction fee of R10 per transaction. Vodacom was again forced 
to re-think the product re-designed the project once again. The new M-Pesa in South Africa 
was launched again on 31 July 2014 with Bidvest as a partner. This time new features were 
added to the product.: A chip and pin protected Visa card was added to the service; a voucher 
system was added to upload cash and convert cash to M-Pesa, similar to buying airtime, at all 
Vodacom shops, selected spaza shops and retailers; access was significantly expanded to  
27 000 ATMs and over 240 000 merchant outlets in South Africa; person-to-person transfers, 
were introduced and customers were promised that additional functionality would be added in 
the near future, and finally usage rewards were introduced. These included airtime and other 
offers, e.g. a doubling of airtime when purchasing airtime via M-Pesa, and free airtime for 
activating the M-Pesa Visa card (Goldstuck, 2014). Vodacom was hoping to emulate the 
success it had with the product in Tanzania, however by the end of September 2015 Vodacom 
Group stated that 1.2 million customers were added to the service since the second re-launch 
in 2014 and 1.3 million customers were active in the system.  
Market commentators remain skeptical about the possibility of the South African M-Pesa 
project ever posting the impressive successes of East Africa markets (Tarrant, 2015). The 
reality of the attempts to duplicate a successful service from other African locations in South 
Africa is that it failed. With a population in excess of 45 million people, the message is that 
‘one size does not fit all’. The financial environment in South Africa has been well established, 
is securely entrenched in  a regulatory framework maturing since the establishment of the first 
central bank in Africa, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) in 1923. A sophisticated 
financial services sector is subject to regulatory oversight, which contributed to the relative 
superficial impact of the GFC on South Africa.  The insistence by the SARB on FICA 
(Financial Intelligence Centre, Act 53 of 2008, amended 2010), compliance indeed subjects the 
mobile money industry to onerous administrative procedures, but this is South Africa. The 
South African Reserve bank is not prone to relax these requirements in the light of the concerted 
effort to curb criminal activities related to money laundering (SARB, 2013). 
The well-entrenched retail banks have succeeded in introducing many entry-level services to 
the unbanked sector, whereby many of the needs of the unbanked had been addressed in a 
different way than in other African markets with much leaner financial services networks or 
less sophisticated service provision.  The FNB ‘e-wallet’ allows anyone with a valid South 
African mobile phone to send and receive money. The Shoprite country-wide money transfer 
service at a fraction of the cost of formal bank transfers, has also entered the market served by 
the M-Pesa product in Kenya and Tanzania. A more convincing argument explaining the less 
than optimal success of M-Pesa in South Africa is that Vodacom changed the marketing angle 
every time the service was re-launched in South Africa, without identifying explicitly what  
M-Pesa was in South Africa. At the first introduction of the service it was marketed as a mobile 
money solution, then in 2011 as a mobile money wallet allowing the user to store money safely, 
and in 2014 it was advertised as a platform to swipe and buy with a Visa card linked to the 
mobile phone (Tarrant, 2015; Tshabalala, 2015). The message was mixed and created 
confusion. 
Vodacom faces competition in the mobile market with FNB, MTN, Standard Bank, and Net 1 
launching or re-launching the products in recent months. MTN, for example, launched Mobile 
Money in Uganda in 2009 and it was successful with over 970 000 users within the first year. 
In August 2014, MTN partnered with Centenary Bank in Uganda to allow their Mobile Money 
Customers to withdraw cash from any of Centenary Bank’s ATMs across the country. 
Additionally, MTN launched Mobile Money in South Africa in 2012, and after receiving 
regulatory approval in March 2014, is able to offer a fully accessible bank account on a mobile 
device. Moreover, customers are able to use the Mobile Money Visa card at ATMs and till 
points to pay various electronic bills and earn customer loyalty points at Pick n Pay stores. 
However again the M-Pesa re-launch by Vodacom has failed to obtain significant number of 
subscribers with only 1.3 million subscribers by the end of March 2015. The success of the 
MTN mobile money initiative with Pick’n Pay is perhaps that the retailer is not a bank in South 
Africa – where the bank charges are notoriously expensive – and has a mass customer base in 
ordinary consumer goods and food (McLeod, 2015; De Vos, 2014). 
Developments in other regions in Africa. 
The M-Pesa advantage as first mover in the market will most probably be difficult to match, 
but the growth in demand on the continent and the overall competitive environment contributed 
to the explosion in the industry. The successful expansion in Tanzania where figures released 
by Vodacom in September 2014 show transactions to the value of $1.2 billion per month 
through M-Pesa (a figure that equals a third of Tanzania’s GDP), is testimony to the future of 
mobile money transactions in SSA (De Vos, 2014; Van den Bergh, 2014). The growth in the 
Tanzanian market occurred because of the very limited banking services networks in the 
country. This is a direct outcome of the total nationalisation of the Tanzanian economy under 
President Julius Nyerere, who introduced the so-called African socialism after independence 
in the 1960s (Austen, 1987). After the era of the ‘Mwalimu’ (Swahili for ‘teacher’ – an 
honorary title given to him as leader of the liberation struggle against colonialism) which came 
to an end with his retirement in 1985 and passing away in 1999, Tanzania joined many African 
nations in embracing aspects of market liberalisation. Where formal banking institutions had 
established themselves in other East African states before decolonisation and continued 
operations after independence, this development was abruptly terminated in Tanzania. As 
Tanzania emerged into the new world of entrepreneurial opportunity and personal earnings, the 
predominantly rural population developed the demand for money transfers. While cash 
remained the medium of choice, logistics mitigated against it. Vodacom partnered with M-Pesa 
to fill the gap, but the Tanzanian market is an open competitive market with Tigo and Airtel 
competing mobile service providers. The expansion in the market is primarily ascribed to the 
large number of agents supporting all three service providers.  In 2013 there were 
approximately 20 000 M-Pesa agents, but by 2014 this number has risen to73 000 – and around 
2 500 agents added per month. This is testimony to the way the Tanzanian society has embraced 
the liberal market as well as the doubling of Vodacom’s network in recent times. Vodacom 
first closed the 2G gap and then moved to become the market leader in 3G service provision in 
Tanzania. M-Pesa complemented these efforts by securing interconnections with Tanzanian 
banks, which gave Vodacom access to both the banked and the unbanked sector in the country. 
Where M-Pesa was first used to transfer money to family and friends, as had been the case in 
Kenya, it developed into a business toll allowing customers the facility to pay for services, such 
as utilities (water and electricity). Merchant payment solutions were added to enable retailers 
to receive payment directly from an M-Pesa account. M-Pesa emerged as an entrepreneurial 
opportunity – agents earned commission from transactions – withdrawals are at a cost, but not 
deposits. Agents conducting 1300 commission per month, can earn up to $350 (Van den Bergh, 
2014).  
The developments in Ghana are following the trend. The official unbanked segment of the 
population is 70 percent, but the rapid growth in the mobile money industry resulted in the 
number of registered mobile money customers leaping from 3 303 837 I 2013 to 5 424 650 in 
2014, an increase of 64 percent. This is about 17 percent of the Ghanaian population. The Bank 
of Ghana recorded a massive rise in the number of subscribers from 20 346 016 in 2013 to 
21 721 814 in 2014.  The value of transactions are equally impressive- from GCc 2.4 billion in 
2013 to GCc 11.6 billion in 2014, which amounted to approximately a third of the 28 banks in 
Ghana’s total deposit liabilities. The government passed new mobile money regulations in July 
2015, which streamlined transaction flows, collaboration between the mobile money industry 
and the banking system and the Bank of Ghana. Competition is also tough in the market, with 
four mobile telecommunication companies operating in the market – Airtel, MTN, Tigo, 
Vodafone. Just over 60 percent of mobile money users in Ghana live in urban areas and only 
19 percent of them live on less than $2.50 a day. In November 2015 Vodafone extended M-
Pesa to Ghana, adding Ghana as the eleventh market in which M-Pesa was offered.  MTN is 
the largest mobile operator in Ghana and announced in November 2014 that it was processing 
about 25 million transaction in excess of GCc 3 billion per month. The industry is active in 
developing innovative products in mobile money services to reach to those outside the system 
and to address specific needs of the rural communities. In March 2015 Airtel announced the 
establishment of an innovative platform in collaboration with Zeepay (a mobile financial 
services aggregator) to enable members of farmer-based organisations to register on the 
platform and buy agro-inputs (such as chemicals, from suppliers registered on the platform) on 
credit, as well as access credit to do farm improvements. The programme is known as Akuafo 
Nkosuo and was piloted in the Ashanti region. Another mobile service provider Tigo partnered 
with BIMA, a micro insurance company to introduce fertiliser-imbued insurance for farmers 
(MobileMoneyAfrica, 2014). These developments are remarkable, given the findings of a study 
by Vivian Dzokoto in 2013 indicating a resounding preference for cash and deep mistrust of 
mobile money in Ghanaian society (Dzokoto, 2014). A factor that affects the industry adversely 
though, is the high levels of taxation of the industry in Ghana. Taxes account for almost 25 
percent of the cost of mobile ownership and the $650 million the mobile operators pay in taxes 
annually, constitutes about 40 percent of total revenue in the sector (GSMA, 2014). 
In Uganda the communication sector is one of the fastest growing sectors in the economy. The 
sector was opened to competition in 2007, currently allowing four operators (MTN Uganda, 
Orange Uganda, Uganda Telecom Limited and Warid Telecom). MTN is the dominant industry 
player controlling 41 percent of the market, but there is tough competition with the other 
operators. The main operators in the mobile money industry in Uganda are MTN Uganda, in 
partnership with Standard Bank, M_Senen from UTL, in partnership with DFCU, and ZAP 
from Zaire in partnership with Standard Charter Bank (Ndiwalana et al, 2012). In 2013 Orange 
Money also entered the competitive market (Gutierez and Choi, 2014). There is no legislation 
governing money services in Uganda, but also nor legal provision for third parties to deliver 
financial services of permission to non-banks to issue mobile money without being subject to 
the full range of prudential regulations applied to banks (Staschen, 2015).The Bank of Uganda 
found an innovative route around these limitations by requesting mobile money operators to 
enter into partnerships with banks that had to apply to the Bank of Uganda for a ‘letter of no 
objection’ to supply mobile money services. The Bank of Uganda aimed at protecting the value 
of the mobile transaction through the regulation of financial institutions (Ssonko, 2010). By 
2015 the statutory position has not changed in Uganda, which left the Bank of Uganda no 
alternative but to issue ‘guidelines’ to provide greater clarity to the mobile money industry. 
This regulatory context shows some similarity to the South African situation, but was different 
from Kenya, where the government refrained from linking the regulation of the banking system 
with the mobile money industry. The mobile market was nevertheless growing – 50 percent of 
mobile phone owners made or received regular payments using their phones. By the end of 
2013 mobile money transfers hit the UShilling 1.6 trillion (around $640 million) level (Tredger, 
2014). Half of the registered mobile money users store money on their m-accounts, but limited 
service innovation occurs in that market. Agents are predominantly doing cash-in-cash-out 
transactions and other bank related services such as bill payments and airtime top-ups, saving, 
credit and insurance transactions are almost non-existent (Ndiwalana et al, 2012; Lee, 2014). 
Recently operators in the mobile market have experienced declining revenue as a result of the 
competition in the market. This led to the marketing of additional revenue streams, such as 
mobile data, 3G broadband services and mobile money services. Uganda is currently one of 
the fastest growing mobile money markets in SSA because of it being the country with the third 
largest registered mobile money accounts per 1000 adults in 2014 in SSA, namely 762. 
(Gutierrez and Choi, 2014; GMSA, 2015).  
 Remittances in Africa 
The rural poor and those living in  remote areas in Africa, have limited or no access to formal 
banking services and thus have to use informal channels to make payment remittances. 
Furthermore the costs of sending remittances in Africa are very high.  
There are many reasons for the high transaction costs in Africa, but a key reason is the 
underdeveloped financial and payment infrastructure.  The limited use of formal financial 
infrastructure impacts directly on the transparency in the market.  Without access to formal 
financial infrastructure there is a greater risk that the remittance sender is not informed of the 
speed of the service and importantly, of all the components of the transaction cost (exchange 
rate used, fees charged, any taxes imposed and any charges imposed on the recipient). This 
lack of transparency, makes it difficult for users of remittances to compare the costs and 
services of various remittance providers adequately when selecting a remittance provider 
(Godoy et al., 2012). This information is also necessary to strengthen competition and in so 
doing reduce the costs.  
Competition in the market is further hampered by the dominance of two money transfer 
operators (MTOs) namely Western Union and MoneyGram that control the market and thus 
can impose their own high tariffs. This has resulted in the continued high tariffs imposed on 
remittances and the continued use of informal channels. However the use of informal channels, 
usually transporting physical cash through friends or relatives who are travelling home on 
public transport, is also costly, slow and inefficient resulting in time delays and exposes the 
additional risk of theft. The other main remittance source providers (RSPs) are financial 
institutions. However according to the World Bank Report (2015b) the most expensive RSPs 
for sending money in Africa, and in fact worldwide, are commercial banks.  
 
 
The diagram above shows that the total average cost of remittances is lower in densely 
populated regions of the world with better developed extensive formal banking systems. The 
average cost of sending $200 (or local equivalent) amounted to 10.64 percent for commercial 
banks, followed by MTOs at 6.51 percent and the post office at 6.04 percent (The World Bank, 
2015). Total average cost of remittances in SSA is about one third higher than the global 
average. This lack of formal banking service infrastructure stimulated the mobile money 
transfer industry, which has developed into the fastest growing avenue of money transfers in 
Africa. As indicated by the growth in mobile phone transfers between June 2014 and February 
2015 between Cȏte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, the mobile banking environment swiftly moved 
to supply in the market demand for banking services to the people in remote rural areas of the 
continent. 
Part of the reason for the high remittance fees associated with banks is the higher overhead 
costs. Commercial banks, unlike MTOs, typically have higher overheads due to the number of 
bank branches, the provision and maintenance of automated teller machines (ATM) networks 
and the costs associated with ensuring compliance with a number of regulations (including 
bank specific regulations and capital adequacy requirements).  
Within the African region, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the most expensive region for 
remittances. This is especially important as SSA has the highest number of domestic 
remittances in Africa with 48 percent of people reported to have sent or received domestic 
remittances in the previous year, according to the latest Global Findex Database 2014 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015). The following graph illustrates the payment channels used for 
sending domestic remittances and highlights that the majority of remittances are still sent in 
physical cash. 
 
 The above figure shows the account penetration from the Global Findex Report which clearly 
illustrates the extent of financial exclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also point to the 
significant growth of mobile money accounts in global terms. The Global Findex was launched 
by the World Bank in 2011 and provides comparable information from 148 countries 
concerning how people save, borrow, make payments and manage risk. Mobile banking allows 
consumers easy access to financial services in their local area and facilitates access of 
households to the formal banking sector thereby providing greater financial inclusion. In Kenya 
there is now a 75 percent account penetration and 58 percent of the population surveyed had a 
mobile money account. Kenya is now the leader in Africa with respect to financial inclusion 
mainly because of the successful use of mobile banking with 75 percent of the population (aged 
15 years or older) having a bank account. This is a remarkable feat considering that in the 2012 
Global Findex report, only 42 percent of adults in Kenya had a bank account. The visible impact 
of the innovations in payment and banking technologies on financial inclusion is clear as 63 
percent of adults in the poorest of 40 percent of Kenyan households, now have a bank account. 
This figure was only 19 percent when the first Global Findex survey was conducted (Demirguc-
Kunt & Klapper, 2012). 
The Global Findex data has shown that the account penetration has dramatically improved from 
2011-2014 with a 20 percent drop in unbanked individuals and with 700 million additional 
bank account holders. The Global Findex report attributes this significant change to a 13 
percent improvement in account penetration in developing economies and due to the 
innovations in technologies, in particular mobile money, that expanded financial inclusion in 
SSA (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015). This is clearly evidenced in the following figure on the 
growth of mobile money account penetration in Africa. This data highlights the growth of 
mobile money in East Africa which has the highest penetration in Africa.   
  
East Africa is leading the way with mobile money adoption. In Kenya 58 percent of the adult 
population have a mobile money account followed by Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda all  35 
percent of the adult population with a mobile money account (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015:12).  
The most important development which has given the mobile money industry massive growth 
potential, is the introduction of network collaboration resulting in interoperability. This means 
that customers are allowed to transact across different mobile networks as well as across the 
borders of different countries. In April 2014 MTN Cȏte d’Ivoire and Airtel Burkina Faso 
entered into an agreement for interoperation in mobile money services. In a similar fashion 
Orange Cȏte d’Ivoire and Airtel Burkina Faso contracted in March 2015 to engage in similar 
collaboration (GSMA, 2015). MTN entered into an agreement with M-Pesa customers in 
Tanzania, the DRC, Mozambique and Kenya and MTN Mobile Money users in Uganda, 
Rwanda and Zambia established the first mobile money corridor in SSA allowing customers to 
transact across networks and countries. In May 2015 Vodafone M-Pesa and MTN Mobile 
Money agreed to allow customers the freedom to transfer funds between the two services. The 
development is a very strong incentive to bring more customers into the mobile money industry 
and to enhance financial inclusion. Similar developments manifested in West Africa, where 
Orange operates an international money transfer service linking Cȏte d’Ivoire, Mali and 
Senegal. This facility quickly gained traction resulting in Orange money remittances to the 
value of nearly one-fifth of World Bank reported remittances between those countries (GSMA, 
2014; Donneley, 2015). These developments are significant in illustrating the strength of the 
growing mobile money industry in countering former cultural distrust and scepticism about 
security, since customers actually see money being remitted and recipients benefitting from the 
transfer of funds. 
Conclusion 
The successes and failures of mobile money payments systems have highlighted the lessons to 
be learnt. This raises the question why have other countries in Africa not been able to 
successfully implement mobile banking on a wide scale as evidenced in East Africa? In most 
of the African countries the serious deficiencies of financial exclusion of the majority of the 
population presented the most fertile ground for the take-up of mobile money services. The 
exception is South Africa, where the sophisticated financial service sector complemented by 
an equally sophisticated regulatory system, poised two different interest groups against each 
other – formal banks with a high cost structure versus e-money service providers operating 
through digital networks and much less costly infrastructure. In order to ensure the success of 
mobile money adoption, network externalities must be established by attracting as many 
consumers and merchants as possible and by providing the convenience and efficiencies of 
other card payment methods. It is also key that financial institutions have strong relationships 
with merchants to ensure sufficient acceptance points for market penetration. In some African 
markets the involvement of major banks was required by statutory regulation to facilitate m-
payments. In some markets this link was functional to the growth in the market, but in other 
markets the experience was different. In Kenya the lack of formal banking involvement in the 
market contributed to the innovative and dynamic development of the industry, while in 
Uganda and South Africa such links proved less than optimal. The absence of a well-developed 
formal banking services sector in Tanzania indeed hampered financial inclusion, but once 
mobile telecommunication companies entered the mobile money industry, financial inclusion 
was achieved more efficiently.  
The higher the mobile money market penetration the more likely that transaction costs will be 
kept low. Barriers to the success of mobile technologies, amongst others, are security concerns 
relating to loss of data and a personal information, and a reluctance of customers to adopt new 
technologies. This reluctance to engage with mobile money technology has a strong cultural 
and tradition-based foundation and has been observed to inhibit the initial decision to enter the 
industry. A preference for cash, which is still a reality in the world as two-thirds of the global 
population still shuns m-banking, is gradually overcome as the population is educated in the 
use of mobile technology and experienced success with mobile transactions. The interesting 
observation is that more people in emerging markets (25 percent) as opposed to respondents in 
developed markets (16 percent) indicated in a recent global survey that they will be using  
mobile financial services in the near future – these include mobile services for  savings, loans, 
insurance and payments solutions for medical purposes, education, etc. (CXTToday.com, 
2015).  
To stimulate the acceptance of the mobile payment system, a wide-spread network of agents 
across the country should be established in order to exchange e-cash for cash and vice versa as 
with the M-Pesa system. In African countries where a dispersed agent network was offered, 
mobile money services struggled to establish themselves, as vast distances between customer 
and agent inhibited frequent usage. Furthermore the mobile payment technology should be to 
be used across mobile networks and should allow payments to be made to non-users. Another 
critical success factor is the expansion of the mobile network. There is also a need for a 
cohesive set of technology standards that both customers and merchants can rely on. An 
integrated, universal set of standards will allow for the widespread use of m-payments and 
cross border acceptance. Policies promoting competition in the telecommunications sector 
have resulted in innovative new technologies and allowed for the realisation of the associated 
cost savings. 
Regulatory systems developed for a sophisticated financial services sector or regulatory 
systems not providing for the delivery of financial services by any other agent than a formally 
registered bank, have proven to be  dampening the development of mobile money services. In 
the case of South Africa growing criminal activities involving money laundering, have 
contributed to the reluctance on the side of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) to relax 
security identification requirements. The phenomenon of illegal immigrants seeking access to 
the South African market, has also contributed to the unrelenting approach of the South African 
central bank with respect to Fica requirements for all money related services – be that entering 
into a mobile phone contract, or using any service of a financial nature. Innovative security 
regulation is required to enhance the e-money services and include those still outside the South 
African banking system into the broader financial services sector. The social development 
benefits of broad utilisation of mobile money has been established. It enhances access to 
venture capital, it empowers entrepreneurs, it facilitates education and medical service 
delivery, it oils the wheels of enterprise, it makes transport services more easily accessible and 
secure and it enables the transfer of money to those outside the employment network. The 
mobile money industry has limitless growth opportunities in Africa, since it can provide the 
services needed more timeously, extensively and affordably than an industry dependent on 
costly fixed cost infrastructure. 
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